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A multi-jurisdictional system is thought to improve, through yardstick competition, 
accountability. At the same time equalization programs, a common feature of multi-
jurisdictional systems, are thought to be a prerequisite for both efficiency of the internal 
market and the equity objective of the equal treatment of equals. This paper shows that such 
programs, by reducing the information context of comparisons across jurisdictions, introduce 
perverse fiscal incentives and thus reduce accountability. The consequence of this is that 
equilibrium rent-taking increases with the intensity of equalization transfers. 
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A common feature of federal economies is the existence of ﬁscal equalization programs
that entail monetary transfers from jurisdictions (‘states’ or ‘provinces’) with above-
average ﬁscal capacity to jurisdictions with lower-than-average ﬁscal capacity. These
transfers thus ensure that have-not jurisdictions have the necessary ﬁscal capacity to
guarantee themselves the national average level of public services per resident without
imposing higher than average tax rates.
It is well understood that such equalization transfers have eﬃciency consequences for
the level of taxation, by distorting ﬁscal policy incentives for receiving governments.
For, equalization transfers, by compensating jurisdictions for the adverse eﬀect of an
increased tax rate on the tax base (of the form familiar from Wildasin (1989)), induce
those jurisdictions to raise taxes higher than it is desirable from a national point of view,
Smart (1998). Of course, federal transfers that induce higher levels of eﬀort might not
be welfare decreasing from a national point of view if equilibrium local tax rates are too
low (K¨ othenb¨ urger (2002), and Bucovetsky and Smart (2006)).1
The implementation of any system of equalization transfers that is based on ﬁscal ca-
pacities is bound to be complicated for two reasons. Firstly, there is the measurement
of actual tax bases. In the absence, as is typically the case, of collection agreements
for most tax bases, jurisdictions can and often deﬁne their own tax bases quite diﬀer-
ently, (see, Boadway (1998), (2004), and Smart (2005), for the Canadian equalization
program). Secondly, equalization formulae are typically complex lending support to the
view of equalization programs as being non-transparent and therefore less subject to
democratic accountability than other government policies. It is conceivable then—and
indeed it is shown this here to be the case—that such transfers, by equalizing ﬁscal
capacity between jurisdictions in a rather nontransparent manner, may interact with
the incentives of policy makers to divert resources away from public good provision and
for personal gain. This possibility, though it has, implicitly or explicitly, appeared in
policy discussions has not attracted, to the best of our knowledge, any formal analysis.
And this is the objective of this paper: to develop a model within which issues of ac-
countability and equalization transfers can be articulated and investigated. It is shown
that an equalization system reduces the intensity of political competition and as such is
conducive to more rent-seeking activities.
The analysis of political competition presented here takes up the idea of relative per-
1Empirical evidence for the impact of equalization on the tax setting behavior of lower level juris-
dictions is provided by Dahlby and Warren (2003) for Australia, Karkalakos and Kotsogiannis (2006)
for Canada, and B¨ uttner (2006) for Germany.
2formance evaluation popularized in Public Finance by Besley and Case (1995).2 These
contributions consider the eﬀect of ‘yardstick’ competition on rent extraction and in par-
ticular on the selection of ‘good’ incumbents. Like in these models, in the present paper
voters of a typical jurisdiction can evaluate the incumbent of their jurisdiction using
information obtained from observing the behavior of a neighboring jurisdiction. Unlike
these contributions, however, we consider the interaction between equalization transfers
and the incentives arising from elections.
We explore this aspect by considering a simple two period model with career concerns
and yardstick competition between the incumbents of two jurisdictions.3 In this model,
the ﬁscal capacity and thus the supply of public goods in a jurisdiction are aﬀected by
the ‘competence’ and the extent of rent-seeking behavior of the local incumbent, but
also by a shock which is common across jurisdictions. Since voters cannot observe com-
petence and rent-seeking behavior nor the common shock, they assess the performance
of the incumbent in their own jurisdiction by comparing public goods supplies across
jurisdictions. An incumbent who takes more rents will see her jurisdiction fare worse in
this comparison and, thus, her chances of re-election are reduced.
We introduce a system of horizontal intergovernmental transfers into this setup where
a fraction of the diﬀerence between the jurisdictions’ ﬁscal capacities is equalized. To
capture the complexity of the equalization transfer, emphasized in the preceding para-
graphs, we introduce a random component in the determination of the ﬁscal capacity of
jurisdictions by the agents.4 Therefore, even knowing the equalization rate, citizens can-
not perfectly derive ﬁscal capacities from the supplies of public goods observed in both
jurisdictions. Hence, the informational content of the comparison across jurisdictions is
reduced. By consequence, the adverse eﬀect of increased rent-seeking by an incumbent
on voters’ assessment of her performance is mitigated by equalization transfers. Thus,
the incumbent politician’s trade-oﬀ between current rents and the probability of winning
the elections is tilted towards more rent diversion. Based on this eﬀect, it is shown that
the amount of rents taken in a (symmetric) Nash equilibrium increases in the equaliza-
tion rate. This suggests that equalization payments may adversely aﬀect the working of
the political system and be conducive to misbehavior by incumbents.
2This theory has been further developed by, among others, Besley and Smart (2003), Bordignon et
al. (2004), Belleﬂamme and Hindriks (2005), and Revelli (2006).
3As in Persson and Tabellini (2000), chapter 9.
4One, of course, may argue that interested parties may have the incentive (if they have the capability
of doing so) to precisely calculate ﬁscal capacities and inform voters, Smart (2005). Though this is
a possibility it does not seem to be a perfectly convincing one. For interested parties, typically, have
opposing incentives in the calculation of ﬁscal capacities giving scope for unlimited conﬂict over transfers.
This conﬂict, as far as the true ﬁscal capacities of the jurisdictions are concerned, is unlikely to be very
informative and, therefore, some uncertainty will still linger.
3Our work is part of the fast growing literature, termed the second-generation theory
of ﬁscal federalism (SGTF), that focuses on the political processes and the behavior of
political agents and their eﬀects on ﬁscal outcomes in federal systems (see Oates (2005),
and Weingast (2006) for comprehensive surveys on the SGTF literature). While identi-
fying institutions and political incentives rather than preferences and technology as the
driving forces, this line of research, like the ﬁrst generation theory of ﬁscal federalism,
aims at explaining the main characteristics of federal systems, such as the vertical al-
location of powers or equalization transfers. Consequently, a ﬁrst and major task has
been to develop a political theory of the beneﬁts and drawbacks of decentralization (see
Seabright (1996), Persson and Tabellini (2000), Lockwood (2002), and Hindriks and
Lockwood (2005)).
Equalization transfers, which are at the heart of our analysis, have also received some
attention in the second-generation theory of ﬁscal federalism. For example, Inman (1998)
and Johansson (2003) provide a rationale for the empirical observation that variations
in transfers to jurisdictions cannot be explained by traditional concerns of equity and
eﬃciency alone. Variables representing political incentives are additional and signiﬁcant
determinants of these transfers. While this is an important issue, our focus here is not on
the political causes of equalization, but rather on the interplay between accountability
and equalization transfers. This issue is brieﬂy touched upon in Smart (2005). More
formally, Careaga and Weingast (2003) show that the common pool problem created by
revenue sharing induces lower level governments to divert resources away from productive
use, a prediction validated by empirical results from Mexican states. Similarly, Baretti
et al. (2002) show that the outﬂow of tax revenues caused by equalization reduces the
eﬀorts by German states to enforce and collect federal taxes. Finally, Boarnet and Glazer
(2002) show that spending in U.S. states is lower when neighboring states obtain larger
federal grants. According to this latter contribution this occurs because politicians at
the state level are considered to be incompetent when they fail to win federal grants
and as consequence a rational response by voters is to force them cut public spending.
To this line of research, which is mainly empirical in nature, our work contributes by
providing a formal model suitable to analyze the impact of ﬁscal equalization on the
political incentives provided by elections.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the model while Section
3 presents its equilibrium. Section 4 brieﬂy concludes.
2 Description of the model
We consider a model with two periods and two jurisdictions labeled i = 1;2 which are ex
ante identical. There is electoral accountability in the sense that voters hold incumbents
4accountable ex post for incompetent behavior in oﬃce. This occurs in an election at
the end of period 1 (described in subsection 2.3). There is a representative citizen in
each jurisdiction whose income per period is normalized, for convenience, to 1. The
citizen pays an exogenously ﬁxed tax of ¯ ¿ per period. The supply of the public good in
jurisdiction i = 1;2 in period 1 is denoted by gi, whereas g2
i denotes public good supply
in period 2.5 The supply of public goods in each period is determined by the ﬁscal
capacity of a given jurisdiction (introduced in subsection 2.1) and the ﬁscal equalization
scheme that is in place (introduced in subsection 2.2).
2.1 Determination of ﬁscal capacity
Fiscal capacity ¿i in jurisdiction i = 1;2 depends on the ‘ability’ (equivalently ‘compe-
tence’) of the incumbent politician in the given jurisdiction, denoted by ´i, the common
economic environment of the federation ", and the actions of the incumbent politician
in terms of the resources diverted away from public good provision towards own con-
sumption, denoted by ri. The competence level ´i, which is a permanent feature of
incumbent i = 1;2, and the economic environment of the federation ", which is common
to both jurisdictions, are both stochastic and unknown to both voters and incumbents.
In particular, the abilities of ﬁrst period incumbents are identically and independently
distributed normal random variables with mean ¹´ = 1 and variance ¾2
´. The common
shock " is normally distributed with mean ¹" = 0 and variance ¾2
", and is independent
from both competence levels ´1 and ´2.
In period 1, the incumbent politician in jurisdiction i = 1;2 decides to take rents ri,
out of the tax revenues collected ¯ ¿. These choices are not observed by voters before the
election. Rents cannot, of course, be negative and so ri ¸ 0, i = 1;2. It is also assumed
that rents satisfy ¯ ¿ > ¯ r ¸ ri, i = 1;2.6 The remaining revenues ¯ ¿ ¡ ri are transformed
into ﬁscal capacities ¿i as follows
¿i = (´i + ")(¯ ¿ ¡ ri); i = 1;2: (1)
Equation (1) simply states that, ceteris paribus, the higher the level of competence of the
incumbent of a jurisdiction the higher the ﬁscal capacity of that jurisdiction. Similarly,
the better the economic environment of the federation, all other things being equal, the
better the ﬁscal capacity of both jurisdictions.
5We denote, throughout, second period variables by the superscript 2. Also, for ease of notation, we
drop the time index for variables relating to the ﬁrst period.
6A possible, and arguably convincing, reason for this restriction is the possibility that a zero pro-
vision of public goods triggers an immediate investigation by an independent authority, such as the
constitutional court, into the workings of the government.
52.2 The ﬁscal equalization program
In practice a typical tax-base-equalization program has the following structure. For the
revenue source a base is chosen to represent, as closely as possible, the actual base of
that revenue source. Total revenues for all jurisdictions from that source are then divided
by the nationwide base to arrive at a ‘national average revenue rate’. This rate is then
applied to the base in a particular jurisdiction and the resulting tax is divided by the
provincial population to obtain the per capita yield of the tax at the national average
rate. The diﬀerence between the jurisdiction’s per capita yield and the national per capita
yield, multiplied by the jurisdiction’s population, represents the base for calculating the
equalization payments due to the jurisdiction with respect to that particular revenue
source. If the diﬀerence is negative (positive), a certain fraction of the diﬀerence, called
the equalization rate, is paid out to (collected from) the jurisdiction.7
As noted in the introductory section, the assessment of ﬁscal capacity in equalization
programs is inherently complex. To capture this complexity we introduce the random
variable8 Γi, i = 1;2, and assume that the ﬁscal capacity of jurisdiction i = 1;2 is
overestimated by the amount Γi. It is thus the value of ¿i +Γi, instead of the true ﬁscal
capacity ¿i, that enters the equalization formula. The speciﬁc form of this variable is
given by
Γi = (¯ ¿ ¡ rj)°i; i = 1;2; (2)
where °i is normally distributed with mean ¹° = 0 and variance ¾2
°. The random
variable °i, i = 1;2, is unknown both to voters and incumbents, they are independent
from each other, and also independent from ´1;´2, and ". This formulation reﬂects the
idea that in each jurisdiction i there is an exogenous source of measurement error °i per
unit of revenues so that the total error is proportional to the average revenues spent
for public good provision. Thus, the random element of the equalization scheme has the
same order of magnitude as the incumbent’s competence and the overall economic shock.
Consequently, a change in rent-taking does not directly aﬀect the relative importance of
the incumbent’s ability in determining the supply of public goods.
7This is, for instance, a variant of the equalization systems in Canada and Germany. In Canada
the equalization rate is constant (derived from using a ﬁve-province standard) and the ‘gross system’ is
applicable whereby only positive equalization entitlements are paid. In Germany the equalization rate
varies with the diﬀerence between the jurisdiction’s own ﬁscal capacity and the average ﬁscal capacity
in the federation but the ‘net system’ is applicable whereby both positive and negative transfers exist.
8While we rather interpret the shock Γi, i = 1;2, as a mistake in the assessment of ﬁscal capac-
ity, as noted in the introductory section, one might also think of this as a deliberate deviation from
pure equalization. Such a deviation might be enacted by the federal government so as to favor some
particular jurisdiction. For the present analysis this interpretation would ﬁt the model as long as this
bias in the federal government’s policy cannot be predicted by voters nor local incumbents. Another
possible interpretation might be that citizens do not fully observe and understand the mechanics of the
equalization system.





¡ (¿i + Γi)
¸
; (3)
where 1 ¸ t ¸ 0 is the federation’s equalization rate. Naturally, since the budget of the
federal economy must balance, we have that Σizi = 0.
Public good provision in jurisdictions i = 1;2 is, then, given by
gi = ¿i + zi;
= ¿i + (t=2)(¿j ¡ ¿i + Γj ¡ Γi); (4)
where the second equality follows from (3), and j 2 f1;2g;j 6= i denotes the other
jurisdiction.
Making now use of (2) in (4) for both jurisdictions and solving these equations simul-
taneously, one obtains, for i = 1;2 and j 2 f1;2g;j 6= i, the level of ﬁscal capacities ¿i
conditional upon the public good supplies in the own and other jurisdiction, gi and gj,
respectively, that is
¿i = gi + µ(gi ¡ gj + Γi ¡ Γj); (5)
where
µ(t) = t=2(1 ¡ t) ¸ 0: (6)
The inequality in (6) follows from the restriction on the equalization rate. Notice now,
for later use, that, following (6)9
µ
0(t) = 2(1 ¡ t)
¡2 > 0; (7)
and so µ is a monotonically increasing function of the equalization rate t. However, since
citizens are not informed about °1 nor °2 they cannot infer ﬁscal capacities from the
observation of g1 and g2. Instead, they must form expectations about ﬁscal capacities,
and the underlying competence levels of the incumbents.
2.3 Payoﬀs and second period decisions
In period 2, ﬁscal capacities and the equalization scheme determine public goods supplies
g2
i, i = 1;2, just as in period 1, by equations analogous to (1)-(4). For the ﬁscal capacity
in jurisdiction i = 1;2, however, now the competence of the government in the second
period is relevant. This is either the competence ´i of the ﬁrst period incumbent, if the
latter is re-elected, or, if she is defeated, the competence of a challenger which is drawn
9A prime denotes the derivative of a function of one variable.
7from the same normal distribution with mean ¹´ = 1 and variance ¾´. Moreover, the
second period government decides on a second period rent r2
i which satisﬁes the same
restrictions as the ﬁrst period rent, that is, r2
i ¸ 0 and ¯ ¿ > ¯ r ¸ r2
i; i = 1;2:
Politicians are interested in expropriating rents collected in both periods and in an
exogenous additional rent from winning the elections, denoted by R > 0. Denoting by ±
the discount factor and by pI;i the probability that the incumbent of jurisdiction i = 1;2
is re-elected for oﬃce in the second period, the payoﬀ to the incumbent of jurisdiction i
is given by
ri + pI;i ¢ ±(R + r
2
i): (8)
Citizens value public goods more than private consumption. Thus, for some constant
® > 1, the utility of citizens in jurisdiction i = 1;2 is given by
ui = 1 ¡ ¯ ¿ + ®gi + ±
¡





In the second period there is no re-election motive anymore and thus every government
will take the maximal rent r2
i = ¯ r;i = 1;2. Nevertheless, given that ¯ ¿ > ¯ r, there
always remains some tax revenue which is used for public good provision. Thus for given
maximal rent-taking behavior a more competent incumbent still produces a higher ﬁscal
capacity. Now, as can be seen from (4), for all equalization rates 0 · t · 1, the supply
of public goods in a jurisdiction is increasing in the ﬁscal capacity of this jurisdiction.
Therefore, a more competent government in a jurisdiction will deliver a higher quantity
of the public good to that jurisdiction’s citizens. Hence, the citizens in both jurisdictions
have an incentive to elect the most competent incumbent. Consequently, in the election
at the end of the ﬁrst period voters in jurisdiction i = 1;2 vote for the incumbent if their
estimate of the incumbent’s ability ˜ ´i exceeds the expected ability of the challenger,
which is given by ¹´ = 1.
3 Equilibrium analysis
The model is analyzed using the Nash equilibrium concept under which the decisions
by voters and incumbents in the ﬁrst period are simultaneously optimal, given a correct
assumption on the other players’ behavior. Following this the optimal voting behavior
of citizens in jurisdiction i = 1;2 is determined by the estimate ˜ ´i they form about the
competence of the incumbent in this jurisdiction. This estimate is based on the informa-
tion citizens have at that moment and on an assumption about the rent-taking behavior
of both incumbents, denoted by ˜ ri, for i = 1;2.10 In subsection 3.1, the formation of the
expectation ˜ ´i, i = 1;2, conditional on ˜ ri and ˜ rj, for j 2 f1;2g;j 6= i, is analyzed.
10The supposed strategies ˜ ri, i = 1;2, just as the rents ri, i = 1;2, actually chosen, do not depend on
the levels of competence ´i since when the rents are chosen competence is not known to the incumbents.
8The incumbent of jurisdiction i = 1;2 decides about how much rents ri to expropriate
anticipating the impact of this decision on the estimate ˜ ´i and, hence, on the probability
of winning the election. This is described in subsection 3.2. An equilibrium requires that
the actual decisions coincide with the assumptions used by the voters, that is, ˜ ri = ri
for i = 1;2. To keep the analysis tractable, we restrict attention to symmetric equilibria
where the incumbents of both jurisdictions take the same rent r, that is, r1 = r2 = r. In
subsection 3.3 the rent taken in such an equilibrium is calculated. The analysis is then
completed by deriving the impact of an increase in the equalization rate on this rent.
3.1 The citizens’ estimate of the incumbent’s ability
To describe how voters in jurisdiction i = 1;2 rationally form the estimate ˜ ´i, consider
the information they possess at the time of the elections. They know that the incumbent
maximizes (8), and they also know the level of tax ¯ ¿ as well as the equalization rate t.
Moreover, they observe the level of public good supplied in both jurisdictions gi;i = 1;2.
It is convenient to describe the citizens’ estimate in terms of a statistic Si deﬁned for




gi + µ(gi ¡ gj)
¯ ¿ ¡ ˜ ri
: (10)
It is intuitive that the statistic in (10) uses only the information available to the voters,
together with the assumption ˜ ri about the amount of rents diverted by incumbent i in
period 1. Following from (5), the statistic in the deﬁnition in (10) becomes
Si =
¿i + µ(Γj ¡ Γi)
¯ ¿ ¡ ˜ ri
: (11)
If citizens now believe that ˜ r1 and ˜ r2 are being chosen by the incumbents then they will
believe that ﬁscal capacities and measurement errors are given by ¿i = (´i + ")(¯ ¿ ¡ ˜ ri)
and Γi = (¯ ¿ ¡ ˜ ri)°i, i = 1;2. This, in turn, implies–following (11)–that for i = 1;2 and
j 2 f1;2g;j 6= i,





¯ ¿ ¡ ˜ rj
¯ ¿ ¡ ˜ ri
: (13)
Equation (12) shows why it is useful to deﬁne the particular statistics Si, i = 1;2. As seen
from (5), the numerators in Si (in (10)) are naive estimates of the ﬁscal capacity in the
respective jurisdiction, which are obtained by ignoring the assessment mistakes Γi, i =
1;2. By dividing this estimate through the tax rate after the presumed rent one obtains
a random number which is additively composed of the competence of the incumbent in
one’s own jurisdiction and the random shocks. Thus, for both jurisdictions i = 1;2,
citizens’ estimate ˜ ´i of the ability of the i-incumbent can be determined additively from
9the observed statistic Si and the expected values of ";°1, and °2, conditional on the
information summarized in the statistics S1 and S2.
Denoting these conditional expectations by E("jS1;S2) and E(°ijS1;S2) for i = 1;2, one
so obtains from (12) for i = 1;2 and j 2 f1;2g;j 6= i,
˜ ´i = Si ¡ E("jS1;S2) + µ[E(°ijS1;S2) ¡ ˜ ½jE(°jjS1; S2)] : (14)
In equation (14), the ﬁve random variables ("; °1; °2; S1; S2) determine the estimate ˜ ´i.
Now following from (12), ("; °1; °2; S1; S2) = ("; °1; °2; ´1+"+µ(˜ ½2°2¡°1); ´2+"+
µ(˜ ½1°1 ¡ °2)). Hence the joint distribution of the random vector ("; °1; °2; S1; S2), as
perceived by the citizens, is the same as for the vector of random variables ("; °1; °2; ´1+
" + µ(˜ ½2°2 ¡ °1); ´2 + " + µ(˜ ½1°1 ¡ °2)). In Appendix A.1 it is shown that, based
on this identity, the citizens’ estimate of the incumbent’s ability is, for i = 1;2 and
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Equation (15) shows, clearly, the working of yardstick competition in this model. When
evaluating the performance of the incumbent in their own jurisdiction, citizens in juris-
diction i do not only consider the signal Si that relates to the ﬁscal capacity in jurisdiction
i, but also the signal Sj that relates to the neighboring jurisdiction j.
We now turn to analyzing how the incumbent in jurisdiction i uses the estimate derived
in (15) in order to assess her probability of winning the election.
3.2 The incumbent’s decision in jurisdiction i
As explained in subsection 2.3, voters will re-elect the incumbent of jurisdiction i if
the estimate in (15) is at least as large as the expected competence of the challenger,
¹´ = 1. Thus, when choosing rents ri in period 1, the incumbent politician of jurisdiction
i perceives the probability of her re-election to be pI;i = Probf˜ ´i ¸ ¹´g = Probf˜ ´i ¸ 1g:
Central to this choice problem for the incumbent is the impact of an increase in the rent
ri on this probability.
The probability distribution of ˜ ´i depends on the distribution of the federation-wide
shock " and of the measurement errors °1 and °2 but also on the distribution of the
10competence ´j of the incumbent in the other jurisdiction j 6= i, since the statistic Sj,
which depends on ´j, enters ˜ ´i in (15). Moreover, since, by assumption, the incumbent
does not know her competence, the distribution of ˜ ´i also depends on the distribution of
´i (and not the realization of ´i drawn by the particular incumbent). In addition to the
random variables, ˜ ´i is also aﬀected by the strategies ˜ r1 and ˜ r2 supposed by the citizens,
which are given for the politicians, and, hence, can be treated as parameters. However,
by choosing the actual strategy ri, the incumbent of jurisdiction i aﬀects ﬁscal capacity
¿i and hence, via the equalization program, both statistics S1 and S2. Thus, by choosing
the rent ri the incumbent inﬂuences the observation available to voters. Similarly, the
rent rj actually taken by the incumbent in the other jurisdiction j 6= i aﬀects ˜ ´i by
inﬂuencing ¿j and hence S1 and S2.
To obtain the probability distribution of ˜ ´i in equation (15) we follow this reasoning and
replace, for i = 1;2, ¿i = (´i + ")(¯ ¿ ¡ ri) and Γi = (¯ ¿ ¡ ri)°i in Si from (11). In doing
so one obtains for both i = 1;2, and j 2 f1;2g;j 6= i
Si =
¯ ¿ ¡ ri
¯ ¿ ¡ ˜ ri
(´i + ") + µ
(¯ ¿ ¡ rj)°j + (¯ ¿ ¡ ri)°i
¯ ¿ ¡ ˜ ri
: (17)
Making use of (17) for both jurisdictions in (15), it is shown in Appendix A.2, that
the estimate ˜ ´i, for i = 1;2;j 2 f1;2g;j 6= i, can be written as a weighted sum of
independent normal random variables
˜ ´i = a1(ri)´i + a2(rj)´j + a3(ri;rj)" + a4(ri)°i + a5(rj)°j + ao: (18)
The notation illustrates that the weights are functions of the strategies ri and rj, while
their dependence on the equalization parameter µ, for brevity, is not displayed. From
(18), ˜ ´i is itself normally distributed. Using this fact, and making use of E(") = E(°i) =
0 and E(´i) = 1 for i = 1;2, one can straightforwardly show that the expectation and
variance of the distribution of ˜ ´i, are given, respectively, by
¹i(r1;r2;µ) = a1(ri)E(´i) + a2(rj)E(´j) + a3(ri;rj)E(")
+a4(ri)E(°i) + a5(rj)E(°j) + ao























where a0;a1;a2;a3;a4 and a5 are deﬁned in (A.6) in the Appendix, and j 2 f1;2g;j 6= i.
Having computed the expectation and variance of the distribution of ˜ ´i, we are now in a
position to solve the maximization problem of the incumbent in jurisdiction i. Following
11from (8), the incumbent chooses ri to maximize ri+Probf˜ ´i ¸ 1g¢±(R+¯ r); with necessary
condition given by
1 +
@ Probf˜ ´i ¸ 1g
@ri
¢ ±(R + ¯ r) = 0: (21)
Using normality, the re-election probability is given by




i) is the normal distribution with mean ¹i and variance ¾2
i, and ¹i(r1;r2;µ),
¾2
i(r1;r2;µ) are as deﬁned in (19) and (20), respectively.






















¢ ±(R + ¯ r) = 0: (23)
Notice that, for later use, diﬀerentiation of F(1;¹i;¾2
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; (24)
where f(¢) is the density of the (¹i;¾2
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jΣ22j(¯ ¿ ¡ ˜ ri)
: (26)
We turn now to the characterization of the equilibrium.
3.3 Characterization of the equilibrium
We conﬁne attention to a symmetric equilibrium, an equilibrium that is in which in both
jurisdictions incumbents take the same rent r = r1 = ˜ r1 = r2 = ˜ r2. Then, following from
(13), ˜ ½1 = ˜ ½2 = 1: This implies ﬁrst that the expectation and variance of the estimates
˜ ´1 and ˜ ´2 are equal, ¹i(r1;r2;µ) = ¹(r;r;µ) and ¾2
i(r1;r2;µ) = ¾2(r;r;µ) for i = 1;2.
Moreover, following from (19), the deﬁnition of the weights a1(r);a2(r), and ao (as stated
in (A.6)), and (16) one obtains ¹(r;r;µ) = 1. Thus, in a symmetric equilibrium the mean
estimate of the incumbent’s competence equals the ex ante expected competence ¹´. This
implies, following also from the symmetry of the normal distribution, that in equilibrium
the incumbent is re-elected with probability 1 ¡ F(1;¹(r;r;µ);¾2(r;r;µ)) = 1=2.
12Since, irrespective of the variance, the normal distribution has half of the probability




2 = 0: (27)


























jΣ22j(¯ ¿ ¡ r)
¢ ±(R + ¯ r) = 0: (29)
The necessary condition (29) allows to characterize the behavior of the incumbents in
the equilibrium. Considering the dependence of ¾(r;r;µ) on r according to (20), this
equation can be solved to yield explicitly the equilibrium rent-taking, as stated in the
following result.
Proposition 1 Rents taken in the ﬁrst period, in a symmetric Nash equilibrium, are
uniquely determined and given by





















¢ ±(R + ¯ r): (30)
Proof of Proposition 1. See Appendix A.3. ¤
Proposition 1 is central to the paper. Close inspection of this result reveals that the
equilibrium level of rents taken by the incumbents in both jurisdictions critically depends
on the variance of competence, ¾2
´, the variance of the federation wide economic shock,
¾2
", the variance of the measurement error to the equalization transfer, ¾2
°, but also µ(t).
It is the latter dependence that is at the center of the investigation here.
Focusing on the equalization transfer rate, t, one observes that, for given noises of com-
petence, economic environment, and transfers, and as long as the equalization transfer is
bounded away from zero, equalization transfers increase rent-taking behavior in a federal
economy. More speciﬁcally, one can arrive at the following Proposition:
Proposition 2 With the rate of equalization bounded away from zero, an increase in
the equalization rate increases equilibrium rent-taking.
13Proof of Proposition 2. See Appendix A.4. ¤
The result of Proposition 2 shows that ﬁscal equalization programs tilt the incumbent
politician’s trade-oﬀ between current rents and the probability of winning the elections
towards more rent diversion. In this trade-oﬀ, the marginal cost of an additional unit of
rent diversion, determined by the loss in the probability of winning the election as given
by the second term in (23), is aﬀected by the equalization rate. To see how, observe
that this marginal cost is composed of two components. First, an increase in rent-taking
worsens the signal Si, and, hence, on average citizens will attribute a lower competence
to the incumbent, as expressed by the term @¹i=@ri in (23). Second, for each unit by
which this average estimate is reduced, the probability of re-election is reduced according
to the density f = ¡@F=@¹i.11
If the equalization rate is increased, the ﬁrst component of marginal cost is reduced in
size. That is, with a higher equalization rate, citizens’ estimate of the incumbent’s com-
petence reacts less strongly to an increase in rents ri. This occurs because the signal Si
is increasingly determined by the noise introduced by equalization and consequently any
given change in observation produced by a given change in rents diversion is increasingly
attributed by citizens to this noise rather than to competence. Essentially, equalization
reduces the quality of the information available to citizens and hence rent-taking by the
incumbent is less likely to be interpreted as incompetence.
Turning to the second component, we note that with an increasing equalization rate, the
statistics Si, i = 1;2 vary more strongly with the noise in the equalization system, and
hence they convey less information about the realization of the incumbents’ competence
´i. Consequently, for given rent-taking strategies, the citizens have less reason to update
their estimate of the competence from the ex ante expectation ¹´, placing more proba-
bility mass close to the ex ante mean ¹´. This implies that the density of the estimate
increases if the equalization rate increases such that from this eﬀect the marginal cost
of rent diversion increases as equalization is intensiﬁed. Proposition 2 shows, however,
that the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates and that the marginal cost of rent diversion is decreased
by equalization.
The mistake in the assessment of ﬁscal capacity is crucial for the eﬀect analyzed in
Proposition 2. Thus, one should expect that if there is no such mistake that is, if ¾2
° = 0,
the incumbent politicians cannot ‘successfully’ hide behind the noise that exists in the
equalization system, and so choose the same rents as without equalization. Indeed this
is the case. The following corollary emphasizes this:
11Recall that the second term in the square brackets in (23) is zero in a symmetric equilibrium.
14Corollary 1 An increase in the equalization rate t has no eﬀect on the equilibrium rents
taken by the incumbent politicians if ¾2
° = 0.
Proof of Corollary 1. The proof of the Corollary readily follows from equation (A.9)
in the proof of Proposition 2. ¤
The appeal of Corollary 1 (and Proposition 1) is in helping to move the discussion to-
wards very practical policy issues. For given uncertainty in the level of competence
of incumbents and the economic environment, what ultimately matters for rent diver-
sion in a multi-jurisdictional system with elections is not equalization per se but rather
how complex the implementation of the equalization program itself is. Interestingly,
this result, thus, provides a theoretical foundation for the popular demand to improve
transparency of equalization systems by reducing their complexity.
4 Concluding remarks
A lot of attention has been paid to the eﬃciency properties of equalization schemes. A
rather neglected issue of equalization transfers is how they interact with the incentives
of incumbent politicians to divert resources away from public good provision and for
personal gain. This paper has explored this aspect. It was shown that an increase in the
equalization rate, starting from a strictly positive rate of equalization, tilts the incentive
of the incumbents towards more rent extraction.
The analysis presented here suggests a number of extensions, that we now brieﬂy dis-
cuss. Firstly, the impact of equalization on the informational content of public goods
supplies has been modeled in a rather speciﬁc way, by assuming that ﬁscal capacities are
imperfectly measured. It remains an open question at this point whether other forms of
incomplete information in the equalization program (one, for example, might be to intro-
duce uncertainty in the equalization rate rather than the assessment of ﬁscal capacities)
will produce similar results.
Secondly, under some circumstances equalization programs might improve, rather than
impair, the information available to voters, since they might make otherwise heteroge-
neous jurisdictions more comparable. For such an eﬀect to prevail, it is reasonable for
one to conjecture, that the equalization system should treat local random shocks diﬀer-
ently from the consequences of the actions taken by incompetent, or selﬁsh, politicians.
It is certainly worthwhile for future work to analyze under what conditions it is possible
to implement such a scheme.
Thirdly, instead of assuming symmetric, incomplete information about the ability of the
incumbent, it appears that another appealing information assumption is to suppose that
15the incumbent knows her own competence and chooses rents so as to signal her type to
the electorate. Whether, and how, such signalling would be aﬀected by the presence of
equalization transfers, is an interesting and challenging question.
Finally, from a normative point of view, the result of Proposition 2 appears to suggest
that equalization transfers in a federal economy have a negative impact on welfare since
they may increase rent-seeking behavior. On the other hand, they do, of course, equalize
ﬁscal capacities which, in a richer model, might provide a beneﬁcial insurance eﬀect (as
in Lockwood, 1999). The overall impact of an equalization system on welfare, therefore,
should be judged on the basis of a genuine comparison between the negative political
aspect of equalization entitlements and the insurance beneﬁt arising from the equalization
of jurisdiction-speciﬁc shocks.
While these extensions are left for future research, the result presented here shows that
the interaction of ﬁscal equalization and political incentives is an issue which deserves
further attention.
16Appendices
A.1 Proof of equation (15).
The vector of random variables ("; °1; °2; S1; S2) = ("; °1; °2; ´1 + " + µ(˜ ½2°2 ¡
°1); ´2 + " + µ(˜ ½1°1 ¡ °2)) has an absolute continuous distribution and hence, following
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Solving (A.2) with the help of (A.1), one ﬁnds


































































(1 ¡ ˜ ½i)¾
2
´; (A.4)
where jΣ22j is as in (16). Substituting (A.3)-(A.4) into (14), after some simpliﬁcation,
one obtains (15). ¤
A.2 Proof of equation (18).
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With the weights deﬁned as illustrated by the braces, (A.6) reduces to (18). ¤
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1.
We start by evaluating ¾2
i(r1;r2;µ) = ¾2(r;r;µ) in (20) at ˜ ½i = ˜ ½j = 1 and ri = ˜ ri = rj =














































































































Taking now the square root of (A.7) and substituting into (29) gives (30). ¤
18A.4 Proof of Proposition 2.
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2(¯ ¿ ¡ r)
¢ µ
0(t): (A.9)
For µ > 0 and with, following (7), µ0(t) > 0, (A.9) is strictly positive. ¤
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